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Economists have long investigated theoretically and empirically 
the relationship between government spending and equilibrium real 
exchange rates. As Frenkel and Razin (1996) summarize for a small 
open economy, government expenditures (financed by lump-sum taxes) 
influence real exchange rates via a resource-withdrawal channel and a 
consumption-tilting channel. Recent theoretical and empirical studies , 
such as Froot and Rogoff (1 991), Rogoff (1992) , De Gregorio, 
Giovannini , and Krueger (1994), De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf 
(1 994) , De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) , and Chinn and Johnston (1 996) , 
have focused only upon the effects of government spending through the 
resource-withdrawal channel. Extending Frenkel and Razin (1 996) , 
this paper generates closed-form theoretical solutions for the 
relationships among the real exchange rate, relative per capita private 
consumption, relative per capita government consumption, and relative 
per capita tradables and nontradables production in a two-country 
general equilibrium model. Using relative price level , private and 
government per capita consumption, and relative productivity data from 
the Summers and Heston (1 991) Penn World Tables and OECD (1 996) 
data for a sample of OECD countries relative to the United States, we 
estimate the model' s structural equations. The results suggest that 
government expenditures influence equilibrium real exchange rates 
approximately equally via the resource-withdrawal and consumption-
tilting channels. Moreover, the results imply that govemment spending 
and private consumption are complements in utility. 
JEL Codes: F31 , F41 , E62 
Key Words: Real Exchange Rate, Govemment Expenditure 
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Government Expenditures and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates 
Economists have long investigated theoretically and empirically the 
relationship between govemment spending and real exchange rates , as 
recently highlighted in sections of Froot and Rogoff (1 995) , Obstfeld and 
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Rogoff (1996) , and Rogoff (1996). Frenkel and Razin (1996) summarize 
nicely the relationship between govemment spending and real exchange rates 
in an intertemporal, neoclassical framework. 1 In the context of a two-period , 
small open economy model, Frenkel and Razin note that govemment 
spending influences the private sector and the real exchange rate essentially 
through two channels: the resource-withdrawal and consumption-tilting 
channels. Regarding the first channel, the influence of govemment 
expenditure is similar to that of a negative supply shock; the effect on private 
consumption and real exchange rates will depend upon the proportion of 
govemment consumption spending falling on nontradables versus that falling 
on tradables. Regarding the second channel, Frenkel and Razin point out that 
the effect of govemment expenditure on private consumption levels and the 
real exchange rate will depend upon the “characteristics of the utility 
function" (p. 165). They note the potential importance of complementarity 
versus substitutability between private consumption and govemment 
consumption in utility, which dictates how the marginal rate of intertemporal 
substitution in utility is influenced by govemment expenditure levels. 
Several recent studies of the determinants of equilibrium real exchange 
rates have provided neoclassical models amenable to econometric 
implementation -- notably Froot and Rogoff (1 991) , Rogoff (1 992) , De 
Gregorio, Giovannini, and Krueger (1994) , De Gregorio, Giovannini , and 
Wolf (1 994) , De Gregorio and Wolf (1 994) , and Chinn and Johnston (1996). 
Although each of these empirical studies incorporates govemment spending, 
all have focused upon the resource• llithdrawal channel for govemment 
spending, ignoring the potential relevance theoretically and empirically of 
complementarity versus substitutability in utility of private and govemment 
consumption, as raised by Frenkel and Razin. De Gregorio, Giovannir祉， and 
Krueger (1994) , De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994) , and De 
IThroughout we are concemed with govemment spending, not fiscal policy. Govemment spending is 
financed here by lump-sum taxes . Since Ricardian equivalence holds in our context, budget deficits related to the 
timing of taxation are not reJevant here 
Gregorio and Wolf (1994) present static models where govemment 
expenditure (financed by lump-sum taxes) falls exclusively on nontradables 
and the effect on the real exchange rate is entirely through the resource-
withdrawal channel. They find a significant short-run (but not long-run) 
effect of govemment spending on the real exchange rate. In intertemporal 
neoclassical contexts, Rogoff (1 992) and Chinn and Johnston (1 996) find 
significant empirical effects of the share of govemment expenditures on real 
exchange rates . However, as in the static models above, govemment 
spending only works through resource withdrawal, though these models 
allow govemment spending on both tradables and nontradables.2 
This paper introduces govemment expenditure into a model of two 
countries' representative consumers behavior to investigate how differences 
in govemment expenditures between countries (alongside productivity 
differences) potentially can explain structural departures from purchasing 
power parity (PPP) and movements in equilibrium real exchange rates. 
Extending Frenkel and Razin (1996) , this paper generates closed-form 
theoretical solutions for the relationships among the real exchange rate, 
relative per capita private consumption, relative per capita govemment 
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consumption, and relative per capita tradables and nontradables production in 
a general equilibrium model of two countries' representative consumers. In 
contrast to the intertemporal neoclassical models of Penati (1987) , Rogoff 
(1 992) and Chinn and Johnston (1996), govemment expenditure influences 
consumers' utility explicitly here, either as a potential substitute for or 
complement to private consumption. In further contrast to De Gregorio , 
Giovannini and Krueger (1994) , De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) , 
and De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) , govemment expenditure is allowed to fall 
on tradables as well as nontradables. Application to the model' s structural 
equations of relative price level, relative per capita nontradables production, 
and relative per capita private and govemment consumption data from the 
Summers and Heston (1991) Penn World Tables and OECD (1 996) data for a 
sample of OECD countries relative to the United States suggests three 
interesting results. First, govemment expenditures influence equilibrium real 
2Penati (1 987) addressed govemment spending (potentially on tradables and nontradables) and equilibrium 
real exchange rates in an intertemporal neoc\assical theoretical model , but similarly focused only upon the resource-
withdrawal channel. His paper did not provide empirical investigation 
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exchange rates in the medium-run via both the resource-withdrawal and 
consumption-tilting channels. Second, we find empirically that the 
consumption-tilting effect of govemment expenditure on real exchange rates 
is approximately equal to the resource-withdrawal effect. Third, govemment 
consumption and private consumption are complements in utility. 
While broadly aimed at better understanding the potential role for 
govemment spending in affecting structural PPP departures in the context of 
an intertemporal neoclassical model, this study additionally sheds light upon 
two secondary, but related, issues. First，的 is widely known , aggregate 
consumption fluctuations are not highly correlated across countries. Recent 
work in open-economy macroeconomics has investigated whether the 
distinction between nontradable versus tradable goods can explain the large 
and persistent movements in relative national price levels and relative 
consumptions among industrialized economies. Backus and Smith (1 993) 
highlight the importance of this issue, but find weak empirical support for a 
monotonic relationship between the real exchange rate and relati ve 
consumption. Because changes in relative prices and relative consumptions 
are dri ven in their model by endowment shocks to tradables and 
nontradables, the authors qualify their weak empirical results by noting 
prominently that a “more general model" 一 that is , one adrnitting “demand-
side shocks" 一 rnight help sort out the issues. The present model employs 
changes in relative govemment expenditures to consider such demand-side 
shocks' effects on the real exchange rate. 
Second, few studies have attempted to evaluate testable implications of 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of real exchange rates , as 
noted by Taylor (1995). The closed-form theoretical solutions in our study 
for the relationships among relative (per capita) consumptions , relative 
nontradables production, relative govemment expenditures, and the real 
exchange rate lend themsel ves to empirical evaluation. The results offer 
insight into the relationship between govemment spending and real exchange 
rates in an intertemporal setting and the weak empirical correlations between 
relative per capita consumption and real exchange rates documented earlier. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The model in section 1 
suggests multiple roles for 
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prices in a dynamic setting. In section 11, we describe econometric analogues 
to the intertemporal and intratemporal equilibrium conditions derived in 
section 1. Section 111 presents empirical results from estimating these 
equilibrium conditions and finds plausible parameter estimates of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the relative share of nontradable 
goods in utility, and the role of govemment expenditures in explaining 
relati ve consumption and real exchange rate movements, using data from the 
U.N.'s Intemational Comparisons Program and OECD's Annual National 
Accounts (1996). Section IV concludes that govemment spending can 
influence equilibrium real exchange rates via both the resource-withdrawal 
and consumption-tilting channels, with the consumption-tilting channel 
having approximately equal impact on the real exchange rate as the resource-
withdrawal channel. 
I. A Two-Country Equilibrium Model with Government 
Expenditures 
Frenkel and Razin (1996, sections 8.2-8.4) describe theoretically the 
relationship between govemment expenditures and the real exchange rate 
using an intertemporal neoclassical model. In the context of a small open 
economy , they outline the potential complementary roles for govemment 
spending influencing private consumption behavior via the resource-
withdrawal and consumption-tilting channels. However, in their two-country 
extension (when either country can influence the world interest rate) , they 
introduce govemment spending into the utility function in a “separable way," 
implying that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in private 
consumption “does not depend on the level of govemment spending" (p. 
262). 
In the following , we outline a two-country model where both the 
consumption-tilting and resource-withdrawal channels of govemment 
expenditure are introduced explicitly. The model is a direct extension of 
Balvers and Bergstrand (1 997), amended to include a govemment sector. We 
first describe the model and then derive intertemporal and intratemporal 
equilibria for specific preferences. Estimable closed-form solutions are 
obtained for a nested utility function with constant relative risk aversion in 
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consumption and with some symmetry conditions imposed on the preferences 
of the two representative consumers. 
A. Description of the Model 
Following Lucas (1978), we abstract from investment decisions by 
assurning endowment economies. Stochastic production processes for all 
goods are owned by the consumers and yield perishable outputs. Each 
country (foreign variables denoted by *) consists of a tradables production 
process, a nontradables production process, and one infinitely-lived 
representative consumer with a time-additive utility function. The tradables 
produced in both countries are perfect substitutes. 3 
In the home country and analogously abroad, the representative 
consumer maxirnizes the expected present discounted value of the stream of 
future utilities from private consumption and the consumption of public1y 
provided goods: 
Max Eo L W u(門， g/) , 、.. ,J l '，E、、
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where Eo represents the expectation conditional on information at time 0, ß is 
the standard discount factor, and u(e) is a current-period utility function 
strictly concave in the consumption index ct and dependent on gt (per capita 
3Since the production processes are exogenous, th巴 consumers take outputs as givens (and factors are 
fixed). The exogenous output structure suggests a model that explains medium-run , rather than long-run , real 
exchange rate behavior. As discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 4), long-run equilibrium real 
exchange rates should be determined by supply-side factors alone, as suggested by the Balas呵-Samuelson
hypothesis; relative govemment expenditures and other relative demand shocks should not matter with homothetic 
preferences in the long run. However, with exogenous outputs, relative govemment expenditures will affect 
equilib付um real exchange rates in the medium run. Th is is consistent with empirical studies , such as De Gregorio , 
Giovannini and Wolf (1 994), where govemment expenditures had short-run, but not long-run , effects on real 
exchange rates 
government expenditure). The consumption index at time t, ct in equation 
(2), represents an optimally chosen basket of the tradable good, ctT, and the 
nontradable good, ct. Preferences over both goods embodied in the 
consumption index are assumed to be homothetic in order that an exact price 
index may be defined. Without loss of generality , we then may apply a 
monotonic transformation such that v(.) in equation (2) is homogeneous of 
degree one and concave in the decision variables. In equation (3) , gt 
represents government consumption, which is produced from govemment 
purchases of tradables, gtT, and nontradables, g戶， via function w(.). 
Government consumption is exogenous to the individual consumer and is 
financed by lump-sum taxes. 
To obtain c1osed-form solutions for the real exchange rate and relative 
consumption (which also make the model amenable to empirical research) , 
we assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) current-period utility 
function for consumption but with generally specified preferences for the 
government expenditures (equation (4)) , and a Cobb-Douglas subutility 
function (equation (5)): 
u(c(,g) = z(g() + h(g)(c() 卜。/(1一σ) ， σ>0
c( = (C(T)l/(l 吋)(C(Nyr/(l 咐 )'>0
(4) 
(5) 
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Letting subscripted variables denote first derivatives, assume Zg(g) > O. Then 
govemment consumption (g) and pri vate consumption (c) are complements 
whenever hig) > 0 and substitutes whenever hg(g) < O. In the case of 
substitutes, it can be assured that ui c,g) > 0 only if Zg(g) > O. The 
preferences of the two countries' representative consumers may differ 
intertemporally in discount factors ß and ß*αnd in functions h(g) and z(g) 
versus h*(g) and z*(g) , respectively , but parametersσand y are assumed 
identical across countries. 
The nested structure of the utility function enables us to separate the 
representative consumer's decisions into an intratemporal decision concerning 
the distribution of overall consumption expenditure between the tradable and 
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nontradable goods and an intertemporal decision conceming the demand for 
assets and the overall expenditure on current consumption. Thus , the two 
equilibrium conditions can be discussed separately. 
Assume complete markets so that productivity shocks are insurable.4 
The Second Welfare Theorem now implies that the competitive equilibrium 
outcome will be equivalent to the Pareto optimal allocation as chosen by a 
social planner. This social planner maximizes the weighted average of the 
lifetime utilities of the two countries' representative consumers by choosing 
the distribution of the tradable good subject to the available quantity. Due to 
the time separability of the lifetime utility functions , the social planner sol ves 
the following decision problem for each period: 
Mαx 
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c( + g( + c( + g( = y( + y( (9) 
The αdenotes the constant weight that the social planner places on the utility 
4Given the CRRA utility and perfect capital mobility assumptions , it can be shown that the existence of 
claims for all produc位on sectors, representing shares in the stochastic endowment processes, is sufficient to 
effectively complete markets in our model 
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of the foreign consumer.5 Equation (8) represents the period market-clearing 
conditions for nontradable goods in both countries. Equation (9) represents 
the period market-clearing condition for tradables goods, reflecting that the 
countries' tradable goods are perfect substitutes. As stated earlier, closed-
form solutions are obtained by constraining some parameters of the utility 
functions to be equal, but the representative consumers can still differ with 
respect to rates of time preference, initial endowments, benefits derived from 
govemment expenditure, and consumption opportunities related to the 
nontradable good. 
Finally, we define the real exchange rate，爪， conventionally as: 
x( = e( p(./p( 、、SJAU ---  '，.‘、
where e t is the nominal exchange rate (expressed in units of domestic 
cu訂ency per unit of foreign currency) and Pt (Pt*) is the domestic (foreign) 
consumption-based price leve1. 6 
B. Intratemporal Equilibrium 
The separability of the lifetime utility function implies a budgeting 
process where the consumer in each period maximizes the (intratemporal) 
value of the consumption index, Cp in equation (5) , subject to an after-tax 
budget constraint, Bp given by: 
B. = D.TC. T + D.N c.N (  p( c(  p( ( 、、s'，-A ',EA r'，、、
where PtT (pt) is the domestic consumer price for the tradable (nontradable) , 
5Note thatαdepends on initial relative wealth of the two consumers and the exogenous processes for 
gov巴mment expenditures. Our formulation , in which the social planner chooses private expenditure but not public 
expenditure, may appear paradoxica l. However, it corresponds to a market outcome for the standard case where 
individuals choose their consumption subject to exogenously determined govemment expenditure 
~e tradable good may serve as the numeraire in both countries, implying e, = 1 in 問uation (10). If 
money is introduced explicitly -- for instanc巴， via a binding cash-in-advance constraint, Il\ = p, c, (and analogously 
abroad) 一 then the prices of the tradable goods will be determined within the model and the exchange rate can have 
any positive value, in principle 
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and similarly for the foreign consumer. Choosing consumption of the tradable 
good to maximize equation (5) subject to equation (11) yields: 
入t = (1 +yrl(CtTrr/(1 吋)(CtN)Y/(1 吋)仇T
and similarly for the foreign country, where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. 
Given homotheticity of the subutility function (c t ) , one can rewrite 
equation (1 1) as: 
Bt PFt 
(12) 
(1 3) 
Since the Lagrange multiplier equals the marginal benefit of a unit increase in 
the budget on the maximum subutility, we also have: 
λt = ac/aBt = lIPt (1 4) 
Combining equations (1 2) and (1 4) , and similarly for the foreign 
country , using the market-clearing conditions for the nontradable goods , the 
law of one price for tradable goods (p/ = erprT*), and the definition of the real 
exchange rate, yields the intratemporal equilibrium condition: 
X
t 
= (</cl[叫o _ gtNo)/(y tN _ gtN)]-r 
Equation (1 5) illustrates the expected resource-withdrawal effect of 
government spending discussed earlier. A rise in per capita foreign 
(1 5) 
government purchases of nontradables causes a rise in the real exchange rate, 
that is , a real appreciation of the foreign currency. 
c. Intertemporal Equilibrium 
In the intertemporal stage of the budgeting process, the social planner 
maximizes in each period equation (6) , the weighted average of the two 
consumers' utilities, subject to the constraints in equations (7), (8) and (9). 
This yields a set of first-order conditions that, by eliminating the Lagrange 
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multiplier, results in: 
(clTry/(1 吋)(CIN)y/(1 吋 ß'lh ﹒ (gl')(CI'rO
=α 
(cIT'ry/(1 吋)(C IN ﹒ )Y/(I 句 Wh(gl)(c1)六 (1 6) 
From the intratemporal equilibrium, the left hand side of equation (1 6) 
equals X t so that the intertemporal equilibrium condition is: 
xt=α(ß*/戶l[h ﹒ (g I')/h(g 1) ](cl' /c)-O (1 7) 
where αand (戶*/ßY can be interpreted in the model's context as initial relative 
wealth and accumulated relative wealth, respectively.7 Equation (1 7) 
illustrates the consumption-tilting effect of government spending discussed 
earlier and the dependence of the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution 
on relative government spending, ornitted in recent studies of government 
spending and equilibrium real exchange rates. Higher per capita foreign 
government consumption may increase or decrease the real exchange rate, 
depending upon the complementarity or substitutability between government 
consumption and pri vate consumption. 
D , Interpretation 
Figure 1 demonstrates the intratemporal equilibrium locus , INTRAp in 
logarithrnic fonn with slope y. It has a positive slope since a higher desired 
foreign consumption level implies more demand so that the foreign price level 
and, accordingly, the real exchange rate needed for intratemporal equilibrium 
are higher. An increase in foreign government purchases of nontradables (g~*) 
withdraws resources from foreign nontradables production. The resulting 
excess demand drives up the relative price of nontradables abroad and the real 
exchange rate, lowering relative foreign private nontradables consumption 
7Note that the intertemporal equilibrium condition is neither stochastic nor explicitly dynamic. Although 
the model is derived in a stochastic setting, the assumption of complete markets implies optimal risk sharing so that 
relative p討ces and relatiνe consumption levels are dete口ninistic. Moreover, the dynamic Euler equation linking the 
marginal rates of intertemporal substitution of the representative consumers to intertemporal price ratios in a market 
economy can be converted to the static version of equation (1 7) when couched in the relative consumption 
allocations assigned by a social planner 
expenditure (point A to point B in Figure 1). 
Figure 1 also displays in logarithmic terms the negative relationship at 
time t between relative consumption and the real exchange rate along the 
intertemporal equilibrium locus, INTERI' with slope -σ. A higher relati ve 
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foreign price level (i.e. , real exchange rate) currently provides relatively more 
incentive for the foreign consumer to defer consumption to the future so that 
equilibrium current consumption abroad declines relative to the home country. 
An increase in foreign govemment consumption (g) can shift the INTER t 
curve up or down depending upon whether govemment consumption 
complements or substitutes for private consumption. If govemment 
consumption complements private consumption (i.e. , hg(g)>O), INTERt shifts 
up , raising the real exchange rate and relative consumption (point A to point C 
in Figure 1). If govemment consumption substitutes for private consumption 
(i.e. , hg(g)<O) , the reverse happens with a rise in foreign govemment 
expenditures (point A to point D in Figure 1). In Figure 1, note the four 
possible quadrants for the equilibrium. Initial equilibrium point A assumes 
the foreign country has higher per capita consumption and price level than the 
home country. 
The model can now be solved explicitly for the real exchange rate and 
relative consumption expenditure, as suggested by Figure 1. For empirical 
pu叩oses ， assume h(g) = gO where 8 > 0 (8 < 0) indicates govemment 
consumption complements (substitutes for) private consumption; analogously , 
let h*(g*) = g*o. Combining equations (1 5) and (1 7) then yields reduced 
forms: 
X
r 
aY/(Y叮
Cr'/Cr α l /(門l(ß */戶)[ 1I(門l]r[(YrN * _ g:* )/(yrN - g力p/(門l(gr*/g/，/(門 (19)
Initial wea1th, rates of time preference, nontradables productivity and 
govemment expenditures a11 affect relative consumption and the real exchange 
rate.8 Equation (1 9) , moreover, implies that consumption levels in the two 
countries need not be highly correlated, as long as relative nontradables 
productivity or relative government expenditure varies substantially. 
11. Econometric Issues 
The reduction of the general equilibrium model to closed-form 
equilibrium conditions (1 5) and (17) and to reduced-form real exchange rate 
and relative consumption equations (1 8) and (1 9), respectively, allows 
estimation. In this section, we discuss the choice of data and relevant 
econometnc lssues. 
Given the model describes medium-run behavior, a data set consistent 
with such behavior is optimal. Annual data may be most appropriate to 
evaluate a medium-run theoretical model. Higher frequency data, such as 
monthly or quarterly time series, would be more appropriate for explaining 
short-run real exchange rate behavior. Lower-frequency data, such as that 
averaged over five-year to fifteen-year intervals , is typically used for 
explaining long-run economic behavior. For a similar categorization, see De 
Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994). 
Since our model has implications for both the time-series and cross-
l3 
sectional behavior of real exchange rates, a panel data set is potentially usefu l. 
Summers and Heston (1991) provide annual time series from 1950 to 1988 on 
relative per capita private consumption expenditures, relative per capita 
government consumption, and relative consumption price levels (or 
consumption-based real exchange rates) for 138 countries with the United 
States as the numeraire (US= 100), designed for pooled cross-section time-
series analysis. The only shortcoming is the absence of a decomposition of 
expenditures between tradables and nontradables. Fortunately, the OECD 
行he reader familiar with the Balassa-Samue\son hypothesis may be concerned in equation (18) over the 
omission of relative tradables productivity levels. However, the productivity-differentials theory of Balassa and 
Samuelson is imbedded in our intratemporal equilibrium. In his analysis, Balassa (1 964) assumes “ invisibles and 
capital movements do not ent巴r the balance of payments," thus avoiding the relevance of the intertemporal 
問uilibrium. It follows that the trade balance must be assumed equal to zero so that not only y~=c~ but also y"~=c; 
Combining equations (7) and (1 5), assuming no government expendiωres ， with market clearing produces: 
x, = [(y;γy;'" )/( y;/y '^) p'( I吋)
which is the Balassa-Samuelson re\ationship. 
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Annual National Accounts, Volume 1I (1 996) enables construction of relative 
shares of consumption expenditures into nontradables (services) and tradables 
(commodities) using the same categorization as Kravis , Heston and Summers 
(1 982) for the United States and ten other OECD countries over the years 
1970 through 1988.9 
The log-linear versions of reduced-form equations (1 8) and (1 9) 
potentially estimable by ordinary least squares (OLS) are: 
ln X i[ = ~φJ+z {[Y/(Y叫][ln(見/戶)]} trendj [ - y[σI(y叫] ln[(y: -gi7)I(yrN _g[N)] 
+ [卸的+σ)] ln(g;/g) + c:[ 
ln (c)c[) = ~吋+ ~ ([lI(y 叫][ln(見/戶)]}的叫[ + [y/(y 叫] ln[(yi7 _g:)I(y [N _g[N)] 
+ [8/(y + σ)] ln(g;/g[) + c~ 
(20) 
(21 ) 
where Xit is the real exchange rate of country i relative to the United States in 
year t , Cit (令ct) is per capita consumption in c∞ountrηY i (U.S.), Y汎ityFN4-古g&ilN(仿yt-gιN
represent臼s per capita nont缸ra叫da油bles production net of govemment a幼bs叩or叩-ptio∞n10
country i (U.S.) , and git (包) is per capita govemment consumption in country i 
(U.S.). 1O Variable trendjt is a time trend whenj=i and is 0 for j 札戶/戶 is the 
9The ten other OECD countries are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greec巴， Italy , Japan , 
Norway , and the United Kingdom. In the work of Kravis , Heston and Summers on the ICP, nontradables 
(tradables) are identical to services (commodities) in private final consumption expenditures. Estimation of the 
econometric analogues to 巴quations (15) , (18) , and (19) requires data on (yN' _gN')/(yN _gN). OECD Annual National 
Accounts does not provide any data on the decomposition of govemment expenditure between tradables and 
nontradab1es , and the decompositions for real GDP are limited and for short time periods. However, OECD data 
does decompose private consumption expenditures between services (nontradables) and goods (tradables) 
Estimation of equations (15) , (18) , and (19) only requires data on relative nontradab1es consumption , since yN _ gN = 
cN (and analogous1y abroad) in the context of th巴 model
IOAs the previous footnote addressed , due to data limitations (y/-git)/(yt-gt) is measured by c//ct 
However, due to the potential endogeneity of this RHS variable, c//ct is replaced by an instrument created from its 
1agged value and a constan t. Although a Hausman specification test did not indicate evidence of endogeneity, the 
results presented in this paper use the instrument to ensure that this RHS variable is predete口nin巴d. Results using 
lS 
discount rate in country j relative to the U.S. discount rate when j=i. The E'S 
are i.i .d. error terms and φ'/ and <D/ are dummy variables assuming the value 
1 whe叫=i and 0 when j 吐， to reflect exogenous differences in initial wealth. 11 
Since the data set includes time series as well as cross section 
observations, one needs to address the issue of data stationarity over time. If 
the individual time series are stationary in log-levels, coefficient estimates in 
these regressions are consistent and the student t-distribution can be used to 
evaluate their statistical significance. However, if the individual time series 
are stationary in first-differences of their log-levels but the series are 
cointegrated, OLS coefficient estimates are consistent but standard t-statistics 
would have to be adjusted to evaluate the coefficients' statistical significance. 
Although the time-series dimension of our data (T=36) is fairly small by 
most time-series analyses standards, Levin and Lin (1992) show theoretically 
the increased power of testing for unit roots in short time series by pooling 
data cross-sectionally. 1n particular, they demonstrate that when the time 
dimension is of “ moderate length (i.e. , 25-100 periods) ," pooling data cross-
sectionally with only a small number of individuals can dramatically increase 
the power of the unit root test. They note that with only 25 time-series periods 
but a panel of 10 units (similar to this study) , the power of the test exceeds 90 
percent. Three studies (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Oh, 1996; and Wu, 1996) 
found evidence that real exchange rates are stationary in log-levels by pooling 
time-series data across country pairs. 
Using the techniques in Levin and Lin (1992), we conducted similar 
tests of stationarity for our relative price level, relative (per capita) 
consumption level, and relative (per capita) govemment consumption level 
variables for the period 1953 to 1988 for all ten countries (relative to the 
United States).12 The results of the tests for nonstationarity are presented in 
C/Ic,N (instead of the instrument) provide a sinúlar fit and the coefficient estimates are not materially differen t. ηle 
latter results are omitted here for brevity, but are available upon r叫uest
II For econometric convenienc皂， we use an intercept and 9 dummy variables 
12 As noted earlier, data was available for these variables for the period 1953-1988. Data was available for 
relative nontradables consumption levels only for the much shorter period 1973-1988. Since the unit root tests for 
the shorter period for all variables would have had a time dimension (with necessary lags) of only 12 perio白， we 
considered this time dimension too short to benefit from the power of the Levin-Lin tests. Consequently, we chose 
to conduct the unit root tesls for all the variables excepl relalive nonlradables consumption for the longer pe討od of 
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Tables 1-3. The tests indicated that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity 
could be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of stationarity for alI 
three variables at the 5 percent significance level , with or without intercepts , 
time trends , and/or fixed-year effects, consistent with the three studies for real 
exchange rates reported earlier. 13 Consequently, we are able to estimate 
specifications (20) and (21) in level form. 
An econometric issue not yet addressed is the identification of the 
parameters. Equations (20) and (21) are reduced forrns from a system of 
equations that are overidentified. 14 Consequently , indirect least squares cannot 
be used efficiently to identify the parameter estimates , but two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) can be used. Two-stage least squares estimation of: 
N N, ,, N N" In X ir ~可+ y 1叭Ic) - y In[(y;r' - g;r')/以 - g/Y) ] + e:r (22) 
ln Xir 百封+百 [ln(ß/ß)] trendjr - σl叭Ic) + 8 1向Ig) + e~ ρ3) 
can yield unique parameter estimates of the relative share of tradables in 
utility (11[1 +y]) , the relative discount rates (ßj /戶)， the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (11σ) ， and degree of complementarity or 
substitutability of government consumption for private consumption (8). 
1953-1988. The results 紅e for tests where the test statistics ar巴 asymptotically nom1ally distributed . We did not 
include tests with individual fixed effects; these effects were statistically insignificant 
13For the relati ve p付ce variable, the null hypothesis could only be r句ected at the 10 percent significance 
level when only an intercept was added 
14For instance, dividing the coefficient for coun的， 1 's time trend in equation (20), ([y/(汁的)[ln (戶 /戶口， by 
the coefficient for this time trend in equation (2 1), {[I/(y+σ)][ln (戶 /ßl}' yields identification of y. However, 
dividing the coefficient for coun叮 2's (or 3's, etc.) time trend in equation (20) , {[y/(汁。) )[ln ( ß!ßl}' by the 
coefficient for this time trend 肌肉uation (2 1), {[ 1/(汁。)][ln ( ß!ßl}' yields identification of y also. Thus, using 
indirect least squ紅的 with the reduced forms cannot identify uniquely y or any of the 10 country pai吋 ngs' relati ve 
discount rates 
Conventional 2SLS is applied. In the first stage, we estimate the reduced-
form equation (21) to obtain the predicted values of ln( cjcJ In the second 
stage, the predicted values of ln( cjct) , denoted pvln( cjct) , are used as an 
“instrument" for ln(cjc t). Hence, regressions (22) and (23) will use the 
predicted values of ln( cjct ) from the first stage. 
Finally, OLS estimation of these equations (reduced-forms or second-
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stage of 2SLS) willlead to consistent estimates. However, in the presence of 
potential autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity of the error terms , the 
standard errors of the coefficient estimates may be inefficient. To account for 
this , we employ the heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent 
covariance estimator of Newey and West (1 987). 
III. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present first the results of estimating reduced-forrn 
equations (20) and (21). The estimate of reduced-form equation (21) 
generates the instrument for estimating structural equations (22) and (23). 
A. Reduced-Form Equations 
OLS estimation of equations (20) and (21) yields: 
ln X it = 4.3753 - 0.8429 ln[~t-g~，)I(I，'.gN)] + 0.3578 ln(g/gt) 
(1 8.65) (2.17) (2.18) 
+ 0.0088 TrendAusit . 0.0103 TrendCanit - 0.0065 TrendDenit 
(0.98) (2.08) (0.56) 
+ 0.0046 TrendFinit + 0.0032 TrendFrait - 0.0212 TrendGre 
(0.42) (0.37) (2 .47) 
+ 0.0041 Trendltait + 0.0325 TrendJpnit+ 0.0022 TrendNorit (24) 
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(0.45) (3.34) (0.22) 
+0.0042 TrendUKit + 0.1479 DVCanit - 0 .4925 DVDen it 
(0.66) (1 .18) (1.36) 
- 0.1530 DVFinit - 0.5780 DVFrait - 3.0579 DVGreit 
(0.79) (1.68) (1.94) 
- 0.6060 DVltait + 0.0129 DVJpnit - 0.2075 DVNorit . 0.3066 DVUKit 
(2.04) (0.09) (0.77) (2.34) 
R2 = 0.64 , AdjR2 = 0.59 , S.E.E. = 0.141 , n = 180 
ln(c/ct) =. 0.2482 + 0.4778 ln[(I:>g~y(l，'-g~)] + 0.2164 ln(g沌t)
(5 .45) (4 .80) (7 .30) 
- 0.0030 TrendAusit . 0 .0027 TrendCan it . 0.0123 TrendDen 
(2.59) (1 .50) (8.20) 
- 0.0039 TrendFinit - 0 .0055 TrendFra it - 0.0046 TrendGre 
(2.23) (4.66) (4.07) 
+ 0.0035 Trendlta it + 0.0001 TrendJpnit - 0 .0042 TrendNorit (25) 
(3.61) (0.04) (2.28) 
+ 0.0016 TrendUK jr + 0.2542 DVCanjr + 0.4434 DVDenjr 
(0.99) (8.20) (4.99) 
+ 0.0592 DVFin j r + 0.4849 DVFra jr + 1.6019 DVGre jr 
(1.24 ) (5.72) (4.05) 
+ 0.2799 DVJta jr + 0.0500 DVJpn jr + 0.2048 DVNorjr + 0.0309 DVUKjr 
(4.02) (2.54) (3.22) (1 .00) 
R1 = 0.99 , AdjR1 = 0.98 , S.E. E. = 0.027 , n = 180 
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses and S.E.E. is the standard 
error of the regression. 
The results indicate that relative per capita nontradables output has the 
expected negative relationship with the real exchange rate in (24) and 
expected positive relationship with relative per capita consumption in (25). 
Relative per capita govemment consumption has a positive relationship with 
both the real exchange rate and relative per capita private consumption, 
suggesting that govemment consumption complements private consumption 
via the consumption-tilting channel. However, as discussed earlier, indirect 
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least squ征es cannot identify uniquely structural p訂ameters because of 
overidentification. Equation (25) is used in the first stage of 2SLS to generate 
the instrument, denoted pvln(c/ct) , used in the next section. 
B. Structural Equations 
20 
Two-stage least squares estimation of equations (22) and (23) -- with 
the restriction that the slope coefficient estimates in intratemporal equilibrium 
condition (22) be equal but oppositely signed (consistent with the model) 一
yields: 
ln X it = 4.8636 + l.2008 pvln(c/ct) - l.2008 ln[(y';>g~y(~-g~)] 
(50.20) (2.15) (2.15) 
- 0.3705 DVCanit . 0 .8452 DVDenit . 0.1730 DVFin 
(2 .45) (l.66) (l.02) 
- l.0233 DVFrait - 4.4972 DVGreit . 0.9774 DVltait (26) 
(2.03) (2.28) (2.71) 
+ 0.1017 DVJpn j( - 0.3865 DVNorit - 0.4051 DVUKit 
(1 .29) (l.31) (3.19) 
R2 = 0.53 , A再jR2 = 0.50 , S.E.E. = 0.156 , n = 180 
ln X it = 3.9375 - 1.7638 pvln(c/cJ + 0.7396 ln(g/gJ 
(9.70) (2.18) (2.96) 
+ 0.0035 TrendA usit - 0.0150 TrendCan it - 0.0281 TrendDen 
(0.37) (3 .16) (l.80) 
- 0.0022 TrendFin; , - 0.0066 TrendFra it - 0.0293 TrendGre 
(0.20) (0.77) (3 .62) 
+ 0.0102 Trendlta j(+ 0.0326 TrendJpnit . 0.0052 TrendNorit (27) 
(0.95) (3.34) (0.54) 
+ 0.0071 TrendUKit + 0.5963 DVCanit + 0.2895 DVDen 
(1.1 2) (2.24) (1.99) 
- 0.0485 DVFinit + 0.2772 DVFrait - 0.2324 DVGreit 
(0.27) (l.83) (0.74) 
- 0.1124 DVlta it + 0.1011 DVJpn it + 0.1538 DVNorit - 0.2521 DVUKit 
(0.98) (0.71) (1.1 0) (2.02) 
R2 = 0 .64 ， A吋R2 = 0.59, S.E.E. = 0.141 , n = 180 
Absolute values of t-statistics are again in parentheses. 
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The 2SLS estimation of the intratemporal and intertemporal equilibrium 
conditions suggests the following inferences regarding govemment 
expenditures, in the context of the model. Equation (26) implies that an 
increase in home govemment purchases of nontradables creates excess 
demand for nontradables. This has the effect of withdrawing resources from 
private nontradables consumption and raising the relative price of (private 
consumption) nontradables to tradables , causing a real appreciation of the 
home cuπency; this is the resource-withdrawal effect. Additionally, equation 
(27) implies that an increase in per capita govemment expenditure raises the 
marginal utility of home private consumption, raising both home per capita 
private consumption and the home relative price of nontradables to tradables , 
causing a real appreciation of the home cu叮ency. The positive estimate of Ò 
suggests that govemment consumption and private consumption are 
complements; the estimate of Ò (0.7396) is statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The 2SLS estimation of the intratemporal and intertemporal equilibrium 
conditions yields the following inferences of the model's other parameters. 
The estimated inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (or the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion) ， σ ， equals 1.76. This estimate is 
consistent with those in the closed-economy macroeconornics literature; 
estimates of σrange typically between 0 and 2. This estimate is statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
The estimate of y is 1.2; this coefficient is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. The equation was estimated also with the restriction relaxed. 
Using a X2 statistic, equality of the two coefficients in intratemporal condition 
(26), allowing for the sign difference, could not be rejected at the 5 percent 
significance level (χ2=1.14 compared to critical value X2[0.95;lJ=3.84). This 
estimate of y implies a share of nontradables in the period Cobb-Douglas 
utility function of 0.55 , which is quite plausible. 
The estimated values of relative discount rates, ß/戶， in equation (27) 
range between -3 percent for Greece and 3 percent for Japan. The estimates 
suggest that the U.S. rate of time preference is not notably greater than that of 
several othcr OECD countries. However, the results suggest that the United 
State 
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statistically less thrifty than Japan. 
C. Relative Effects of Government Expenditure Consumptioll Tiltillg vs. 
Resource Withdrawαl 
The parameter estimates in equations (26) and (27) allow us to estimate 
the relative importance of the resource-withdrawal versus consumption-tilting 
effects of government expenditure on real exchange rates. To illustrate the 
relative effects for a one percent increase in the home country's (U.S.) 
govemment purchases of nontradables (g~) ， consider theoretical real exchange 
rate equation (20). Differentiating equation (20) with respect to g~ yields: 
N N d ln Xir = 一 [ycr/(y+σ)] d ln[ lI(y/' -gr")] + [8y/(y + σ)] d ln( lIgr) (28) 
Recalling equation (3) , assume govemment consumption is a Cobb-Douglas 
function of government nontradables and govemment tradables, where ç 
denotes the share of nontradables in govemment consumption. Thcn equation 
(28) becomes: 
N" N N" • N , N dX,/xir - [yσ/(y+σ)][g/ï(y/' -g/')] dg/ïg/' - Ç[8y/(y+σ)ldgr/grh(29) 
The first (second) terrn on the RHS represents the resource-withdrawal 
(consumption-tilting) effect of a one percent increase in home govemment 
purchases of nontradables. To evaluate the contribution of the first tenn, an 
estimate of g~/(y~-g~) is needed and to evaluate the second terrn an estimate of 
ç is needed. Such data is not available for any country in either Summers and 
Heston (1 991) or OECD Annual National Accounts (1 996). However, the 
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts decompose govemment and 
private consumption expenditures into goods and services , which is used 
typically to approximate the decomposition into tradables and nontradables. 
For the United States, 
g伙
1970-19gg. Substituting these values into equation (29), along with the 
paramctcr rstimates of yσ/(y+σ) and '6y/(y+σ) yields: 
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N dx,/xi, -0.3624 dg ,"/g," - 0.2755 dg/'/gr (30) 
Equation (30) indicates that the estimated magnitude of the resource-
withdrawal effect on the real exchange rate of a one percent increase in U.S. 
government purchases of nontradables is only slightly greater than the 
consumption-tilting effec t. 
If a U.S. government consumption increase of one percent is 
proportionate across nontradables and tradables , the theoretical effect on the 
real exchange is: 
N" N N dXi/Xir - [yσ/(y+σ)][g/ï(y/' -g ,")] dg/g , - [òy/(y+σ)] dg / g r (31 ) 
Substituting into equation (31) the appropriate parameter estimates yields: 
dx，/xi， 一0.3624 dg/gr - 0.3578 dg/gr (32) 
In the case of proportionate increases in U.S. government tradables and 
nontradables consumption , a one percent increase in government consumption 
appreciates the dollar by roughly 0.7 of one percent; the source of the dollar's 
real appreciation is estimated to be attributable approximately equally to the 
consumption-tilting and resource-withdrawal channels. 
IV. Conclusions 
The NBER Reporter noted not too long ago that: 
One of the recent areas of resurgent research in open economy 
macroeconomics has been the examination of real exchange rates. . 
Chinn and Johnston find that government spending and productivity 
trends help in the analysis of real exchange rates; their finding is 
confirmed by Canzoneri , Cumby, and Diba, and by De Gregorio and 
Wolf (Rose, 1997, pp. 1-2). 
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This paper has extended the intertemporal neoclassical framework for a small 
open economy in Frenkel and Razin (1 996) to examine theoretically and 
empirical1y the “ resource-withdrawal" versus “consumption-ti1ting" effects of 
government expenditure on real exchange rates. Closed-form theoretical 
solutions from a two-country , stochastic, dynamic , general equilibrium model 
il1ustrated the effect of government expenditure on private consumption 
decisions through intratemporal and intertemporal channels. 
Empirical evaluation of the model using panel data from the U.N. 
Income Comparisons Program and OECD (1 996) provides evidence that a per 
capita government expenditure increase may be causing a real appreciation of 
a country's cu叮ency via resource withdrawal in the medium run. 
Simultaneously , the same government spending increase may causc the 
country's cu叮ency to appreciate in real terms because government 
consumption complements the utility from private consumption. Moreover, 
these cffccts are found in the context of plausible parameter estimates of the 
countries rcpresentative consumers' elasticities of intertemporal substitution , 
relative rates of time preference, and shares of nontradables in utility. The 
empirical results suggest that the potential importance of the consumption-
tilting channel should not be ignored since this channel has roughly an equal 
effect on the real exchange rate as the resource-withdrawal channel. 
The cxtant literature on real exchange rates has traditionally perceived 
the real appreciation of a country's cuπency as a cost necessarily incurred to 
benefit from the provision of public goods , interpreted typically as the 
oppo口unity cost ofjoregone private consumption (notably of nontradables 
private consumption). Our framework and empirical results suggest that the 
associated real appreciation of a country' s currency in response to increased 
2S 
public consumption can be interpreted partiaIly as the shadow price of a 
benefit to the representative agent' s utility from the complementarity of 
govemment and private consumption. This suggests reconsidering the relative 
benefits of public expenditures and their implications for explaining 
departures from purchasing power parity. 
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Table 1 
Tests for Nonstationarity of Relative Price Levels 
Using Panel Data and Levin-Lin (1992) 
Null Hypo!hesis 
10% (5%) of 
Model O{\ Estimate t-statlstlc Cri!ical t Nonstationarity l 
la. ~Yit = (Po-l) Yit-I + Eit -0.04 -2.68 -1 .44 (-1. 81) Rejcct (Rcject) 
lb. ~Yit = (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Yit-I -0.06 -3 .88 -l.44 (-1.81) Rejcct (Rcject) 
+ Eit 
lc. ~Yit = (Po-I) Yit-I + PI ~Yit-I -0.06 -3 .69 -1.44 (-1. 81) Rejcct (R吋ect)
+ P2 ~Yi t -2 + Eit 
2a. ~Yit = 80 + (Po-l) Yit-I + Eit -0.03 -1.91 -1.72 (-2.09) Rejcct (No! 
R吋ect)
2b. ~Yit = 80 + (Po-l) Yit-I -0.05 -3 .35 -1.72 (-2 .09) Reject (Reject) 
+ Pl ~Yi卜 1 + Eit 
2c. ~Yit = 80 + (Po- l) Yit-l -0.05 -3 .08 -1.72 (-2.09) R吋ect (R吋ect)
+ PI ~Yit-l + P2 ~Yit-2 
+ Eit 
3a. ~Yit = 80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-I -0.07 -3 .85 -2 .01 (-2.39) Rejcct (Reject) 
+ Eit 
3b. ~Yi ( = 80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-l -0.10 -5.33 -2 .0 I (-2.39) Rcjcc! (R叮ect)
+ PI ~Yit - l + Eit 
3c. ~Yi( = 8日 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yi(-I -0.10 -5.06 -2 .01 (-2.39) Rejcc! (Rcjcct) 
+ Pl ~Yi(-1 + P2 ~Yi(-2 
+ Ei( 
4a. ~Yit = (Po-l) Yit-I + vt + Eit -0.04 -2 .89 -2 .01 (-2.39) Rej C'c! (R<'Jcct) 
4b. ~Yi( = (Po-I) Yit-I + Pl ~Yit- I -0.05 -3 .06 -2 .0 I (-2.39) Rej<'c! (R<,ject) 
+ v( + Ei( 
4c. ~Yit = (Po-l) Yit-I + Pl ~Yit- I -0.04 -3.00 -2 .01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ P2 ~Yit-2 + v( + Ei( 
1 At the 10% (5%) significance level 
Table 2 
Tests for Nonstationarity of Relative Per Capita Consumption Levels 
Using Panel Data and Levin-Lin (1992) 
Nul\ Hypothesis 
10% (5%) of 
Model 2IIEstimate t-statlstlc Critical t Nonstationarity l 
la. !::.Yil = (Po-l) Yil-l + eil -0.02 -9.55 -1.44 (-1.81) Reject (Reject) 
lb. !::.YIl = (ρ0- 1 ) Yil-l + Pl !::.Yil -l -0.02 -7.74 -1.44 (-1.81) Reject (Reject) 
+ Cil 
lc. !::.YIl = (ρ0- 1 ) Yil-l + Pl !::.Yil-l -0.02 -6.98 -1.44 (-1.81) Reject (Reject) 
+ 112 !::.Yil-2 + eil 
2a. !::.YIl = Òo + (Po-l) Yil-l + eil -0.03 -7.43 -1.72 (-2.09) Reject (Reject) 
2b. !::.Y'l = 00 + (Po-l) Yil-l -0.03 -6.64 -1.72 (-2.09) Reject (Reject) 
+ rl !::.Yil-l + eil 
2c. !::.Y'l = Òo + (Po-l) Yil-l -0.03 -6.39 -l.72 (-2.09) Reject (Reject) 
+ Pl !::.Yil-l + P2 !::.Yil-2 
+ ell 
3a. !::.Yil = 00 + 01 t + (Po- l) Yil-l -0.03 -6.25 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ eil 
3b. !::.Yil = 00 + 01 t + (Po-l) Y叭- 1 -0.03 -5 .74 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ Pl !::.Yil-l + eil 
3c. !::.Yil = 00 + 01 t + (Po-l) Yil-l -0.03 -5.66 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ Pl !::.Yil-l + P2 !::.Yil-2 
+ eil 
4a. !::.Yil = (Po-l) Yil-l + vl + eil -0.03 -7 .10 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
4b. !::.Yil = (Po-l) Yil- l + Pl !::.Yil- l -0.03 -6.10 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+Vl + eil 
4c. !::.Yit = (Po-l) Yil-l + Pl !::.Yit. l -0.03 -5.84 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ P2 !::.Yit-2 + vl + eit 
lAt the 10% (5%) significance level 
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Table 3 
Tests for Nonstationarity of Relative Per Capita Government Consumption Levels 
Using Panel Data and Levin-Lin (1992) 
Null Hypothesis 
10% (5 %) of 
Model Po Estimate t -statlstlc Critical t Nonstationaritv l 
la. ~Yi t = (Po-l ) Yit-I + eit -0 .03 -12.66 -1.44 (- 1.81) Reject (Reject) 
lb. ~Yit = (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Yi t - I -0.02 -9.38 -1.44 (-1. 81) Reject (Reject) 
+ eit 
lc. ~Y it = (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Yi t-I -0_02 -8 .94 -1 .44 (-1.8 1) Reject (Reject) 
+ P2 ~Yit-2 + eit 
2a. ~Y it = 80 + (Po-l) Yi卜 1 + eit -0.02 -4 .32 -1.72 (-2.09) Reject (Reject) 
2b. ~Y it = 80 + (Po-l) Yit- I -0.02 -4 .37 -1.72 (-2 .09) R吋ect (Reject) 
+ PI ~Yi卜 1 + eit 
2c. ~Y it = 80 + (Po-l) Yit-I -0.02 -3. 86 -1.72 (-2 .09) R吋ect (R吋ect)
+ PI ~Yit-I + P2 ~Yit-2 
+ eit 
3a. ~Yit = 80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-I -0.02 -3 .37 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ eit 
3b. ~Yit = 80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-I -0 .02 -3 .27 -2 .01 (-2 .39) Reject (Reject) 
+ PI ~Yit﹒ 1 + eit 
3c. ~Yi t = 80 + 81 t + (Po-l) Yit-I -0.01 -3 .18 -2 .01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ PI ~Yit- I + P2 ~Yit - 2 
+ eit 
4a. ~Yi t = (Po-l ) Yit-I + vt + eit -0.02 -5 .11 。 2 . 01 (-2 .39) Reject (Reject) 
4b. ~Yit = (Po-l) Yi t- I + PI ~Yit-I -0 .01 -4.61 -2 .01 (-2 .39) Reject (Reject) 
+Vt + eit 
4c. ~Y it = (Po-l) Yit-I + PI ~Yit- I -0.01 -4 .62 -2.01 (-2.39) Reject (Reject) 
+ P2 ~Yi t-2 + vt + eit 
'At the 10% (5 %) significance level. 
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